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ABSTRACT
This paper measures the housing market impact of state-level anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s
using household-level and census-tract data. State-level “fair-housing” laws attempted to bar
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin in the sale, rental, and financing of
housing, and they were the direct antecedents of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. Their
influence on the housing market outcomes of African Americans has not been assessed in previous
work by economists, but policy variation across states during the 1960s provides an opportunity to
pursue such estimates. During the 1960s, blacks’ housing market outcomes improved relative to
whites’, and the proportion of exclusively white census tracts declined markedly. But I find little
evidence that the fairhousing laws contributed to those changes. Rather, the bulk of the evidence
indicates that the laws’ effects on blacks’ housing market outcomes, on residential segregation, and






william.collins@vanderbilt.edu1 Audit studies of housing market interactions have revealed ongoing discriminatory behavior (see
Yinger 1998), and other studies have discussed the shortcomings of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968
at length, but the extent to which any changes in discriminatory behavior associated with fair-housing laws
have translated into better housing market outcomes for protected groups remains unmeasured. 
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1. Introduction
At mid-century, an array of barriers inhibited African Americans’ residential mobility, including
racially restrictive covenants among white property owners, biased lending practices of banks and
government institutions, strong social norms against selling or renting property to blacks outside
established black neighborhoods, and harassment of blacks seeking residence in otherwise white
neighborhoods (Myrdal 1944, Weaver 1948, Abrams 1955, Sugrue 1996, Meyer 2000, Brooks
2002).  Since then, the potentially adverse effects of housing discrimination on blacks’ accumulation of
wealth through housing equity and on blacks’ access to high quality schools, jobs, and public goods
have been widely discussed (Kain 1968, Oliver and Shapiro 1995, Yinger 2001).  A related literature
has sought to understand the apparent connection between residential segregation, in part a legacy of
housing market discrimination (Kain and Quigley 1975), and a variety of adverse socioeconomic
outcomes (Massey and Denton 1993, Cutler and Glaeser 1997, Collins and Margo 2000).
Given these concerns, it is not surprising that dismantling housing market discrimination has
been among the top priorities of civil rights groups and urban policymakers for decades.  Starting in
1959, states began implementing “fair-housing” laws to curb discriminatory practices by sellers, renters,
real estate agents, builders, and lenders.  By the time the federal government passed the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 22 states, covering 57 percent of the total U.S. population and 41 percent of the black
population had already passed fair-housing legislation, usually with more extensive coverage and
stronger enforcement mechanisms than in the federal act.  Although fair-housing laws are commonly
placed among the Civil Rights Movement’s central legislative achievements, their impact on blacks’
housing market outcomes has not been examined directly and empirically.1  Of course, the laws did not
completely undermine discriminatory practices nor the residential patterns that such practices had
promoted.  The more relevant questions concern how much headway the laws made on discriminatory
practices and segregation, and especially, whether black families improved their housing situation2
because of the laws’ implementation.
Understanding the state fair-housing laws’ impact is important for two reasons.  First,
residential segregation and housing market discrimination are still serious concerns for policymakers. 
Debates about these issues should be informed about how anti-discrimination policies worked, or did
not work, in the recent past.  The state laws provide a valuable, but neglected, source of evidence. 
Second, the economics literature on the contribution of Civil Rights-era legislation to blacks’ economic
progress is heavily weighted towards federal labor market legislation, with special emphasis on the
South.  Allocating some attention to housing legislation at the state level, primarily outside the South, will
contribute to a more balanced and accurate assessment of the Civil Rights Movement’s economic
impact. 
It has been noted that during the 1960s, blacks’ average housing market outcomes improved
relative to whites’, at least according to broad and commonly referenced measures (Bianchi, Farley,
and Spain 1982, Collins and Margo 2001, 2003).  Among household heads, the racial gap in home
ownership rates fell from about 27 to 25 percentage points.  Among home owners, the value of black-
owned housing increased from about 53 to 60 percent of white-owned housing.  Even after controlling
for household characteristics (such as income and education), the racial gaps in ownership and value
narrowed between 1960 and 1970.  Also, in the 1960s middle- and upper-class black families moved
to suburban neighborhoods in larger numbers than ever before, and the average level of residential
segregation within cities began to decline around 1970 (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999).  All of this
leaves the door open for a significant fair-housing policy effect, but it is far from a direct evaluation of
the hypothesis that fair-housing laws helped improve blacks’ housing market outcomes.
How could the fair-housing laws have contributed to improvement in blacks’ housing
outcomes?  As discussed in more detail below, the laws were intended to lower barriers to blacks’
entry into predominantly white neighborhoods and new housing developments, and to curb
discriminatory treatment of blacks seeking mortgages, thereby lowering the effective cost of  housing
and expanding minorities’ set of housing opportunities.  If this mechanism actually worked as intended,
then one would expect blacks to increase their housing consumption relative to whites, ceteris paribus. 3
One might also expect to see more racial integration in neighborhoods, though in theory, this need not
follow.  Of course, given that the laws’ enforcement mechanisms were far from draconian and that
discriminatory biases in housing markets were deeply rooted, it is possible that the laws had no
detectable effect whatsoever.   
In 1963, the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, an umbrella organization
for several religious, labor, and civil rights groups, claimed that fair housing laws “are proving to be an
increasingly important factor in the movement of minority-group families into residential areas which
formerly were closed to them.”  But already, the organization noted that “civil rights groups have
become increasingly dissatisfied with the rate of progress under the laws” (Sept.-Oct. 1963, pp. 1-2). 
The extent to which there was progress under the laws, and due to the laws, remains an unanswered,
empirical question. 
I review the history of fair-housing laws in section 2 and outline the economics of their potential
impact in section 3.  In section 4, I discuss the empirical strategy for analyzing household-level data.  In
short, the measurement of fair-housing effects is facilitated by variation in anti-discrimination policies
across states during the 1960s.  The results of the household data analysis are discussed in section 5. 
An alternative empirical perspective that explores census-tract data is developed in section 6.  
2. A Brief History of Fair-Housing Laws
State and local governments incrementally adopted nondiscriminatory standards for public
housing starting in the late 1930s.  The application of anti-discrimination policy to the private housing
market, however, was among the Civil Rights Movement’s least popular initiatives among whites, and
as a result, fair-housing legislation lagged years behind fair-employment and public accommodations
laws (Lockard 1968).  Even in 1970, after the passage of the federal Fair Housing Act, less than 30
percent of northern whites favored fair-housing laws according to a National Opinion Research Center
survey (Greeley and Sheatsley 1971, p. 18).  On one level, this reflected whites’ concerns about crime,
property values, schools, and interracial social contact.  On another level, it reflected the rhetorical
strength of the argument that the government ought not infringe on perceived private property rights,4
particularly with respect to homes (NCDH, Sept.-Oct. 1963, p. 4). 
Nevertheless, as the Great Migration of blacks to central-city neighborhoods continued through
the 1950s, and as the Civil Rights Movement gained momentum, fair-housing initiatives rose toward the
top of the Movement’s legislative agenda.  The National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing
(NCDH) was organized in 1950 to help advocate anti-discrimination measures and to report on their
legislative progress.  Seven years later, New York City adopted the nation’s first fair-housing ordinance
which served as a model for several of the subsequent state laws and was itself based on existing fair-
employment statutes (Lockard 1968, p. 118).  While granting exceptions for the rental of rooms in or
attached to owner-occupied homes (the “Mrs. Murphy rule”), the ordinance (as amended in 1962)
stated that: 
“no owner, . . . real estate broker, . . . or other person having the right to sell, rent,
lease, . . . or otherwise dispose of a housing accommodation . . . shall refuse to sell,
rent, lease . . . or otherwise deny or withhold from any person or group of persons such
housing accommodations, or represent that such housing accommodations are not
available for inspection, when in fact they are so available, because of the race, color,
religion, national origin or ancestry of such persons” (Housing and Home Finance
Agency 1964, p. 287).  
It also barred discrimination in the terms of sale or rental, advertisements expressing discriminatory
preferences, and discrimination by banks and lending institutions.  Finally, it outlined a procedure for
handling complaints and enforcing the policy.  
The state fair-housing statutes initially had varying degrees of coverage.  Table 1 reports the
timing of each state’s initial adoption and later extension of fair-housing laws up to 1968.  Almost all
states included a Mrs. Murphy rule.  More importantly, some states also exempted activities
surrounding the sale or rental of owner-occupied single-family homes.  Others, listed in column 2,
allowed the owner-occupiers of homes to discriminate while simultaneously prohibiting discriminatory
acts by real-estate brokers, advertisers, lenders, and builders.  By 1968, as listed in column 3, several
states had converged to a standard that covered virtually all sales and rentals (except those by Mrs.
Murphy).  In general, these state laws contained stronger enforcement mechanisms than the federal
legislation passed in that year (discussed below). 2  For example, Lockard (1968, pp. 126-127) reports that the New York agency, with some
assistance from the FHA, coordinated a non-discriminatory agreement among apartment builders who
were otherwise locked in a prisoner’s dilemma.  That is, absent the coordination (and potential sanctions)
provided by the agency, the builders articulated an incentive to defect from the non-discriminatory
principle.
3 See Donohue and Heckman (1991) on the effective “excuse” that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
might have provided southern employers.
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Following procedures established to enforce the earlier fair-employment laws, the
administrative agencies charged with enforcing the fair-housing laws did so, for the most part, by
responding to individual complaints rather than by seeking out discriminatory practices.  When
presented with a viable complaint (i.e., within the law’s coverage), the agency would conduct an
investigation.  If evidence of discrimination was found, the agency’s representatives would attempt to
persuade the discriminatory party to comply with the law.  If the discriminatory party refused to
cooperate, a public hearing could be held, a cease and desist order and/or fine could be issued, court
proceedings could be undertaken, and (if appropriate) a real estate agent’s license could be suspended. 
Of course, all of this would take time, and households attempting to move might not have been willing
or able to wait for redress.  Beyond their enforcement role, fair-housing agencies often undertook
broad educational campaigns and offered advice to community leaders and housing industry
participants regarding residential integration.2 
The effectiveness of this approach in dealing with housing market discrimination or, more to the
point, in improving blacks’ housing market outcomes, is unclear a priori.  The anti-discrimination
measures were weak in the sense that the agencies’ first step was always to seek “conciliation” rather
than punishment.  Thus, even if caught, there was no immediate penalty and perhaps little incentive to
adjust discriminatory policies until confronted by the agency.  Even so, the passage of the laws and the
threat of sanctions against resistant builders, lenders, or real estate agents might have facilitated
conciliation procedures once initiated, might have modified discriminatory behavior immediately
(rendering complaints unnecessary), and might have provided a convenient excuse for those who
wished to do business with blacks but felt constrained by community norms.3  Moreover, the speed
with which some neighborhoods “tipped” from white to black might have amplified spillover effects4 Though the literature on the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 has demonstrated that inferring a
law’s impact from caseload data is problematic, it is at least worth noting that in 1970 there were 1,008
federal fair-housing investigations undertaken, of which only 89 were classified as “successfully
conciliated” by the year’s end (HUD 1970, p. 85).  The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
substantially broadened enforcement powers (Yinger 2001).
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from enforcement efforts.  Finally, it is possible that the passage of the law itself or the state agency’s
educational campaigns contributed to changing social norms regarding discrimination and residential
segregation.  As suggested above, whether the fair-housing laws actually contributed to the observed
relative improvement in blacks’ housing market outcomes remains an unanswered empirical question.
The federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 initially exempted privately owned, single-family housing. 
The policy’s coverage was extended over the next two years, but the Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (HUD) enforcement powers remained severely circumscribed (Yinger 1999). 
Informal, clandestine efforts at persuasion were allowed, nothing more, not even the threat of a public
hearing.  If persuasion failed, the complainant was then free to sue for an injunction in federal court. 
The federal law also specified that a state with its own fair-housing law had initial jurisdiction over any
complaints originating there.  The empirics below proceed as though the 1968 Fair Housing Act had a
negligible (or an even-across-states) effect on African Americans’ relative housing market outcomes by
the time of the 1970 Census.4  
3.  Discrimination and the Potential Impact of Fair-Housing Laws 
In theory, the potential impact of a fair-housing law depends on how discriminatory attitudes
and institutions influenced the housing market equilibrium prior to the law’s implementation. 
Discrimination could either raise or depress the relative price of housing for blacks, and therefore has
indeterminate effects on observable housing market outcomes (e.g., ownership rates, crowding, quality
of structure, et cetera) (Kain and Quigley 1975; Courant 1978; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999).  In
the simplest formulation, white and black areas may form distinct submarkets within which prices
(normalized to homogeneous units) are determined by demand and supply.  A stable boundary or
division of housing between blacks and whites would require that the effective price facing members of5 This model’s characterization is similar in some ways to that in Kain and Quigley (1975).  The
model does not really depend on having geographically distinct white and black “areas” and a “boundary”
in between, though the text’s language reflects the prevalence of residential segregation.  All that is
necessary is that there are higher transaction costs (broadly defined) when buying from someone (or near
someone) of a different race.  For a discussion of models in which the “boundary” idea is central, in that
whites’ utility increases with distance from blacks, see Courant and Yinger (1977).
6 In discussing the formation of the black ghetto in Harlem in the 1920s, Osofsky argued that
rents were relatively high despite “deplorable” living conditions because of “the unprecedented demand
created by heavy Negro migration and settlement within a restricted geographical area” (1966, p. 136). 
As suggested in the model sketched above, the boundaries of the ghetto expanded in response (p. 127). 
7 Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor argue that through mid-century, discriminatory practices “made
blacks pay relatively more for housing in more segregated cities than they otherwise would have” (1997,
p. 487).  Becker (1957) also suggests that blacks in Chicago paid more than whites for equivalent housing
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each group on the other side of the boundary is greater than the price on their own side.5  That is, for
whites, PW is less than or equal to PB + CW; and for blacks, PB is less than or equal to PW + CB, where
PW and PB are prices in the white and black submarkets respectively, and CW and CB are additional
costs associated with buying or renting housing from a member of the other group.  These additional
costs are broadly construed, and may include changes in distance to work, harassment by disgruntled
neighbors, search and transaction costs (perhaps including a bonus to homeowners of the other group
to sell against the wishes of their neighbors), and lost utility associated with being surrounded by one’s
own racial group.  If either of these inequality conditions did not hold, then members of one group
would buy or rent housing previously owned or rented by members of the other, and the racial
distribution of housing would shift until a new equilibrium is reached.
In practice, for most of the twentieth century, the economics and history literatures suggest that
the constraint on blacks was binding.  That is, from the outset of the Great Migration during World War
I, black residents in metropolitan areas pressed against the boundaries of circumscribed neighborhoods;
these neighborhoods expanded when and where the internal pressure was strong enough to outweigh
countervailing pressure from whites (i.e., whenever  PB > PW + CB).6  In this scenario, black
neighborhoods would expand just to the point where the price gap is offset by the extra costs of
crossing the existing racial boundary (PB = PW + CB).  Along these lines, Kain and Quigley wrote in
1975 that “most types of housing are more expensive inside the ghetto, and that a premium is required
to shift bundles to the ghetto submarket” (p. 68).7  In general, whites did not seek to move intobundles.  Also see King and Mieszkowski (1973) on this issue.
8  In 1959, the Pennsylvania Governor’s Committee on Discrimination in Housing reported that
“Negro Pennsylvanians have been almost totally excluded from the many hundreds of thousands of new
homes built by private enterprise since World War II” (p. 8).  Likewise, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights notes (without attribution) that “As late as 1959, it was estimated that less than 2 percent of the
FHA-insured housing built in the post-war housing boom had been available to minorities” (1973, p. 5).  It
is not clear exactly what “excluded” and “available” mean, but the point is clear – new suburban housing
was essentially white housing.  One could suppose that there was also a price at which new black
suburban housing developments should have come into being.  Based on anecdotal evidence, one could
argue that the price of new housing construction for blacks was higher than for whites because of barriers
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established black areas; after all, the quality-adjusted price was apparently higher and the “additional
costs” are presumed positive (on net).  Rather, as described in detail by Abrams (1955) and Meyer
(2000), white homeowners, real estate agents, and financial institutions collectively imposed a high cost
on blacks attempting to move into white neighborhoods.  In a search model for housing, Courant
(1978) demonstrated it is not necessary for all whites in a given neighborhood to collude against
potential black residents to generate an equilibrium in which whites enjoy lower housing costs than
blacks and in which there is persistent racial segregation.  Rather, as the proportion of white sellers who
are averse to dealing with blacks rises, so do the expected search costs faced by blacks considering
buying from whites.  Only if the price gap between white and black neighborhoods exceeds a certain
threshold level (a level that rises with the proportion of discriminatory white sellers) will blacks attempt
to buy housing from whites.
Taking these characterizations as a starting point, and supposing that the total supply of housing
is initially fixed, an equilibrium where PB = PW + CB implies that blacks consume less housing than they
would in the no-discrimination equilibrium, and whites consume more.  Ceteris paribus, the
implementation of effective anti-discrimination laws could have lowered the costs imposed on blacks
trying to buy or rent property.  If so, then the racial price gap would narrow and the quantity of housing
consumed by blacks would increase.  
One might suppose that the margin of extension of the suburbs is determined by the price of
existing white housing relative to the price of new housing construction.  In this period, new suburban
housing was consumed almost entirely by whites, so this appears to be a reasonable addition to the
model.8  In this scenario, if the implementation of a fair-housing law puts upward pressure on the priceto financing and land acquisition.  
9 Of course, owner-occupied housing can be transformed into rental housing, and often was, and
so the categories for the housing stock are not truly fixed.  
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of white housing, as suggested above, then the housing stock can simply expand in response.  If the
price of new construction (PNEW) is exogenously fixed, then the supply expands until there is no longer
upward pressure on PW.  Ceteris paribus, the price and quantity of white housing would return to their
original levels, and by implication, the quantity of black housing would increase by the amount of the
supply’s expansion.  Thus, even though the new housing is actually consumed by whites, the quantity of
housing consumed by blacks increases through a “filtering” process.
So far, the analysis has not attempted to distinguish between rental and owner-occupied
housing.  It is possible that the application of anti-discrimination measures, particularly to mortgage
lenders and insurers, lowered the price of owner-occupied housing for blacks (relative to renting),
thereby encouraging more home ownership.  Likewise, if the initial stock of housing available for blacks
included a low proportion of owner-occupied units relative to the stock of housing initially owned by
whites, then the black home ownership rate might have increased as units were transferred from whites
to blacks.9 
This simple model does not allow for heterogeneity among households, but it is certainly
plausible that different age, income, or education groups responded to or were affected by the laws in
different ways (hypotheses that will be investigated below).  For example, influential work in the
literature on the deterioration of central-city black neighborhoods cites the loss of relatively well-
educated blacks to suburban neighborhoods after the passage of fair-housing legislation (Wilson 1987). 
Along these lines, a 1963 publication from the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing
claimed that “the chief beneficiaries thus far [have been] nonwhites of middle-class status” (Sept.-Oct.
1963, p. 1).  In the context of this section’s model, which does not attempt to address potentially
positive spillovers from high human capital neighbors, movement away from central-city neighborhoods
would lower housing demand in those neighborhoods, thereby lowering housing prices, alleviating
crowding, and allowing increased housing consumption for those who remained, at least in the short to10 Some discussion of urban renewal programs that may have lowered the net housing stock in
central city neighborhoods is provided below.
11 Section 3's model predicts that the price of housing for blacks should fall, but because the
property value information in the household-level census data will also reflect unobserved changes in
quality, movements in observed prices are difficult to interpret.  For example, an effective law might
lower the “true” price of housing but simultaneously allow blacks to move to better neighborhoods (which
would tend to raise the observed price).  A better set of comparisons, offered in section 6, focus on
changes in the relative price of housing in predominantly black neighborhoods. 
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medium run during which the central-city housing stock is assumed fixed.10  
4. Empirical Strategy: Household Data
Although I am unaware of any previous econometric effort to identify the impact of state fair-
housing laws, there is a literature that measures the impact of state-level fair-employment laws (Landes
1968, Stigler 1973, Heckman 1976, Neumark and Stock 2001, Collins 2003).  The early fair-
employment studies examined state-level aggregate data, but the more recent efforts, like this paper,
have used micro-level data in difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) frameworks, where
comparisons are made between states, between races, and over time, while controlling for a variety of
household-level covariates as well as state, race, and time fixed effects. 
The simple model outlined above suggests that, ceteris paribus, blacks’ consumption of housing
should have increased by more between 1960 and 1970 in states that had extensive fair-housing laws
than in other states, if the laws actually worked as intended.  To gauge housing consumption, the census
collects and consistently reports information on a handful of basic housing characteristics, including
whether the unit is owner-occupied, the number of rooms, the number of bathrooms, the age of the
building, whether it is detached or attached, its estimated value or current rental price, and (though
sometimes compromised for confidentiality purposes) whether it is in a central city, suburb, or neither. 
For now, the empirics focus on observable housing characteristics, postponing the study of property
values and rental rates to section 6 where census tract data allow more informative comparisons.11
The model collapsed all housing into quality-adjusted housing units, and in that spirit, I created a
hedonic index based on the valuation of observable housing characteristics in 1960 (separately for
renters and owners, and for blacks and whites).  Specifically, for each race category, I regressed the12  I repeated the exercise when the comparison group of states changed.
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log of rent or value on a series of indicators for the number of rooms, number of bathrooms, age of unit,
and whether it was a detached unit.  Then, given the regression coefficients, I assigned each housing unit
(for both 1960 and 1970) a predicted hedonic value.12  The idea is to isolate changes in the quantity of
housing consumed by collapsing an array of housing characteristics, weighted by the regression
coefficients, into a single index.  More transparently, but less comprehensively, I examine several
dimensions of housing quality independently (e.g., rooms, bathrooms, building age, etc.).  I also look for
fair-housing effects on the likelihood of home ownership and the size of households. 
I start with a fairly broad sample from the 1960 and 1970 Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS, Ruggles and Sobek 1997), including all native-born male and female household heads
who were not in school, not living on a farm, and were from 20 to 59 years old.  Then, in case the laws
affected subgroups of the population differently, I narrow the focus to relatively young household heads
(under 40), to those who have recently changed residences (within five years), or to those with at least
12 years of education.  In general, when assessing changes in housing characteristics, I examine
samples of renters and owners separately because the laws differed in some ways across rental and
owner-occupied housing, and because the characteristics of rental and owner-occupied housing are so
different.  Selection out of rental and into owner-occupied housing, as well as selection into headship,
are legitimate concerns even with controls for household and household head characteristics, and so I
start by examining the laws’ influence on household size and home ownership rates.  
As mentioned above, the fair-housing estimates are formed using difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DDD) regression frameworks.  Essentially, DDD estimation compares blacks’ housing in
states with relatively extensive fair housing laws (“experimental states”) to blacks’ housing in states with
narrow or no fair housing laws (“non-experimental states”), relative to whites’ outcomes within each
state-group (a second difference), before and after the laws’ adoption (a third difference).  When
helpful, I also refer to difference-in-difference (DD) estimates that compare the magnitudes of changes
in blacks’ outcomes in experimental and non-experimental states (without differencing by whites’
outcomes).  The regressions control for several relevant household characteristics, including the log of13 One might also like to include a metropolitan residence dummy variable, but in 1960 and 1970
many households are assigned indeterminate status for confidentiality reasons.  Rather than discard the
observations, I proceeded without the metro status variable.
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real family income (and a dummy for topcoded income), the number of persons in the household
(quadratic), and the number of children in the household (a series of dummies).  The regressions also
control for the head’s years of education (quadratic), age (quartic), marital status, veteran status, sex,
and whether the head moved from another state within the last five years.13
The choice of “experimental”and “non-experimental” states is a key aspect of any DDD
strategy.  The identifying assumption is that there were no unobserved contemporaneous shocks or
trends that affected the outcomes of blacks relative to whites in experimental states relative to non-
experimental states.  All other shocks and trends should be effectively differenced out by design or
captured by the household characteristic variables.  The next subsection offers some supporting
evidence for the choice of state-groups, and I check the robustness of the basic results using alternative
comparison groups, population subsamples, and specifications. 
The basic DDD regression set up is:
(1)  Hijt = a + b1 Xijt + b2 Blackijt + b3 FHj + b4 Yeart  
  + b5 (Blackijt × FHj) + b6 (Blackijt × Yeart) + b7 (FHj × Yeart) + b8 (Blackijt × FHj × Yeart).
H is a housing market outcome variable; i indexes households, j indexes the two groups of states
(experimental and non-experimental), and t indexes two census years.  X is the vector of household
characteristics listed above.  Black is a dummy variable equal to one for blacks; FH is a dummy
variable equal to one for states that adopted relatively strong fair-housing laws before 1965; and Year is
a dummy variable equal to one for the later census year in the comparison.  In an additional
specification, I also include the proportion of each state’s population that was black and that
proportion’s interaction with the black dummy variable to control for the influence of changes in the
relative size of the black population on blacks’ relative housing market outcomes.  In another
specification, I add state and state-year dummies to control for unobserved state-level shocks that
affect blacks and whites alike.  Difference-in-difference (DD) regressions for blacks only (or whites
only) are similar in form but, of course, do not require dummies for race or interactions between race14 See Besley and Case (2000) or Meyer (1995) for more extensive discussions of the
opportunities and pitfalls of DDD methodology. 
15 Because the 1960 census microdata for households do not report city codes, it is impossible to
identify municipalities; rather, work must proceed at the state-level while keeping underlying and
potentially confounding municipal policies in mind.
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and other variables.
In this basic regression, b2 reflects time-invariant and state-invariant differences between blacks
and whites.  b3 reflects time-invariant and race-invariant differences between strong fair-housing states
and weak fair-housing states.  b4 captures race-invariant and state-invariant changes over time.  b5
captures time-invariant differences between blacks and whites in strong fair-housing states relative to
weak fair-housing states.  b6 reflects state-invariant changes in blacks’ housing market outcomes
relative to whites’.  b7 reflects race-invariant changes over time in the strong fair-housing states relative
to weak fair-housing states.  Finally, b8 measures the change in blacks’ outcomes relative to whites’
outcomes in strong fair-housing states relative to weak fair-housing states.  This is the regression
estimate of the fair-housing effect.
Choosing State-Groups for Comparison
The interpretation of the b8 coefficient as a “fair-housing effect” is most tenable when the
groups of states being compared are economically and socially similar, and therefore subject to
common, though perhaps unobserved, shocks and trends.14  This consideration guides the selection of
states for comparison here.  In the case of fair-housing laws, the selection is complicated by differences
in the extent of the state laws’ coverage, as well as by the presence of municipal ordinances.15  For the
experimental state-group, I selected states with policies that covered (nearly) all owner-occupied and
rental housing by 1965: Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and
Rhode Island. 
For comparison, I formed two sets of non-experimental states: “non-experimental group A”
may be a closer match with the experimental states based on economic and political characteristics, but
“non-experimental group B” has a sharper differentiation of policy.  Group A consists of Pennsylvania,14
Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin all of which had fair-housing initiatives that were narrower in coverage
than those of the experimental states.  Pennsylvania passed an early fair housing law (1961) that omitted
owner-occupied, one- and two-family buildings, as did the city ordinances in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
and Erie.  Ohio’s 1965 law also omitted owner-occupied, one- and two-family buildings; its major
cities did not pass ordinances; and smaller cities (e.g., Akron and Toledo) that did pass ordinances
often saw them struck down by referendum or in court (NCDH 1966).  Illinois did not pass a private
fair housing law, and Chicago’s ordinance (1963) and Governor Otto Kerner’s executive order (made
in 1966 but suspended by injunction) applied only to real estate agents (Landye and Vanecko 1968). 
Wisconsin’s 1965 fair housing law exempted single-family owner-occupied housing units and owner-
occupied apartment buildings with less than five units. 
The distinction between the policies pursued by the experimental states and group A of the non-
experimental states is not as sharp as one would like, especially in rental markets; hence the motivation
for forming a second comparison group.  Non-experimental group B consists of Delaware, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia, all of which had weak or no state fair-housing laws applying to
private housing.  The tradeoff is that group B is not as geographically proximate nor as economically
and politically similar to the experimental states as Group A is, and so the identifying assumption
regarding unobserved shocks and trends may be more at risk.
Table 2 reports a series of relevant state characteristics for the three groups of states.  The
figures for 1960 indicate how similar the state-groups were at the beginning of the period under study in
terms of both population averages (for black proportion of population, ownership rates, persons per
room, proportion of households in at least 30-year old housing units, proportion of households with two
or more bathrooms, family income, and votes for George Wallace in 1968's presidential election) and
black-white disparities.  For the most part, the 1960 characteristics are similar across the state-groups,
though as expected, non-experimental group B is less similar to the experimental states than group A is. 
The differences that stand out are that proportionally fewer households resided in owner-occupied
housing in the experimental states than in the other groups (58 versus 63 percent), the black-white
disparity in the likelihood of residing in 30-year old housing is smaller in the experimental states (2316  Along these lines, Meyer (1995) points out that changes in state laws may provide useful
quasi-experimental frameworks when the change in policy is abrupt relative to the change in underlying
public sentiment.
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versus 27 and 29 percent), and non-experimental group B had lower average family income and less
“older” housing.  
The votes-for-George-Wallace variable has been used elsewhere to gauge discriminatory
sentiment (Bergman and Lyle 1971, Heckman 1976), and a somewhat lower proportion of voters in
the experimental states (7 percent) voted for Wallace than in the non-experimental states (9 and 12
percent in groups A and B respectively).  If that is a reasonable gauge, one might hypothesize that
blacks’ acquisition of housing was more actively impeded in more discriminatory states during the
1960s, and that therefore the empirics could have a built-in bias that favors finding a positive fair-
housing effect.  This hypothesis is worth keeping in mind, however, in the model outlined above, when
PB = PW + CB, different levels of discriminatory sentiment would have a “level effect” but not a “growth
effect” on blacks’ housing outcomes, and there is no evidence that discriminatory sentiment changed by
more in one state-group than in the others.  
If discriminatory sentiment had changed by more in the states that passed comprehensive laws
than in those that did not pass laws, then b8 would capture the influence of both the laws and the
differential trends in sentiment.  Though it is impossible to rule out this possibility altogether, it is worth
noting that nationally, there was not a dramatic change in sentiment regarding housing market
discrimination during the 1960s.  In 1963 and 1970, the National Opinion Research Center charted
adult whites’ reaction to the following statement: “White people have a right to keep Negroes out of
their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes should respect that right.”  In 1963, about 43 percent
of whites disagreed with the statement; in 1970, about 50 percent did (Greeley and Sheatsley 1971, p.
14).  Unfortunately, the responses are not reported by state, but it seems that the scope for differential
changes in public attitudes regarding housing discrimination across the set of states used in this paper is
rather narrow.16  Greeley and Sheatsley do report trends for a broader measure of discriminatory
sentiment by South versus Non-South, and it appears that even across very dissimilar regions the
changes in sentiment were of similar magnitude (p. 15).  Again, if there is a bias, it is likely to raise the16
b8 coefficient by bundling the effect of differential changes in discriminatory sentiment together with the
effect of the laws.  
A variation on the “differential change in sentiment” hypothesis is that blacks’ attitudes towards
housing discrimination and segregation may have shifted further in experimental states than in others,
independent of the laws.  There is a surprising scarcity of survey information for blacks during this
period, let alone data that are disaggregated by region or state, but the existing evidence does not
suggest that there were large changes in attitudes towards residential choice during the 1960s: nearly all
blacks surveyed in 1964 and 1970 agreed that blacks “have a right to live wherever they can afford to,
just like anybody else”.  In a “general segregation” question with more room for upward movement, 78
percent of blacks surveyed favored desegregation in both 1964 and 1970 (Schuman et al. 1997, p.
242).
Of course, for b8 to measure the fair-housing effect accurately, the laws must be exogenous to
changes in the racial gap in housing market outcomes.  Collins (2002) explores the political economy of
fair-housing law adoption at length.  That paper’s empirical findings, and the historical literature from
which the paper draws (e.g., Lockard 1968), emphasize differences in political, ethnic, and economic
characteristics across non-southern states, rather than changes in racial disparities in housing market
variables within states, in explaining the timing of policy adoption.  However, the size of the black
population does appear to have influenced the timing of fair-housing adoption, could have had an
influence on blacks’ relative housing market outcomes, and changed non-trivially over time in several
states.  With this in mind, I check the sensitivity of the basic regression results to the inclusion of each
state’s black proportion of the population (in year t), interacted with the black dummy variable to
capture the differential effect of black population growth on blacks’ relative housing outcomes. 
Examining the data for pre-existing trends is somewhat more difficult than checking the levels in
1960 because the 1950 IPUMS sample does not include housing information.  Relying on the published
census volumes for housing information, I report 1950-1960 trends at the bottom of table 2.  The state-
groups, particularly the experimental states and non-experimental group A, appear to have been
trending similarly in terms of the black proportion of the population, the proportion of owner-occupied17 Coefficients for the probit regressions in tables 3, 4, and 6 represent the change in probability
associated with switching the triple-interaction dummy from 0 to 1 (for all observations) when all other
variables (including dummies) are set at their sample means.  In principle, these probit coefficients cannot
be directly interpreted as the magnitude of the treatment effects.  But in the relatively few cases when
the probit coefficients approach conventional levels of statistical significance, OLS analogues, whose
interpretation is straightforward, are close in magnitude. 
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housing units, the proportion of housing units built during the 1950s, and the average level of log family
income.  The racial gap in nominal family income did widen by more in the experimental states than
elsewhere during the 1950s, but all the regressions below will control for family income.  Thus, while
the 1950 to 1960 trends and the 1960 levels cannot completely rule out the possibility of confounding,
unobserved shocks during the 1960s, table 2 does support the notion that the state-groups are
reasonable bases for comparison.  
5. Household Data Results
Ownership and Household Size
Most of the DDD regressions are run separately for renters and owners, primarily to see
whether the laws’ effects differed across types of housing.  Some caution is necessary here, however,
because selection into home ownership is not random.  To a large extent, the differencing strategy and
the controls for observable X-variables (such as income, marital status, age and so on) should mitigate
selection issues.  But if there is a race-specific change in the nature of selection into home ownership
that differs across state groups, perhaps due to the fair-housing laws themselves, then the interpretation
of the results obtained using only owners or only renters could be biased. 
Table 3 offers some direct evidence on this hypothesis by reporting DDD probit coefficients for
ownership status.17  The idea is see whether black households increased their likelihood of owning a
home, relative to whites, by more in the experimental states than in the control states, conditional on
observable household characteristics (though results are similar without controls for X -variables). 
Using non-experimental group A, there is no evidence that the fair-housing laws facilitated movement
into the ownership category.  Using non-experimental group B, the coefficients are positive but
statistically weak in most specifications.  18
I also check whether the formation of households was influenced by the laws, perhaps by
facilitating the establishment of households by younger adults.  In table 3, household size is treated as a
dependent variable in the DDD framework.  Again, there is no evidence that the fair-housing laws were
associated with significant relative changes.  These results go some distance towards alleviating
concerns about unobserved selection into home ownership.  Moreover, appendix table A1 confirms
that the basic results reported below are unchanged when owners and renters are pooled into a single
sample.
Housing Characteristics
Table 4 reports b8 coefficients for regressions in which the dependent variable is one of a
variety of housing characteristics.  Summary statistics for the housing characteristics are reported in
appendix table A2.  The first two columns report DDD coefficients for the probability of having two or
more complete bathrooms (z-statistics are in parentheses).  Among owners, the coefficients are weakly
negative; among renters, the coefficients are weakly positive.  The coefficients do not approach high
levels of statistical significance in either case.  
The third and fourth columns report DDD coefficients for living in housing that was more than
30 years old (the topcode in the 1960 and 1970 census).  The coefficients are again statistically weak
in general, and when not weak (as for young renters), are positive.  To check whether the results are
driven by white flight to new housing developments in response to the fair-housing laws, it is
straightforward to make DD comparisons among whites only.  That is, did whites in the experimental
states increase their likelihood of residing in newer housing (under 30 year old) by more than whites
elsewhere?  By this metric, there is no evidence that whites in fair-housing states had a larger decline in
the likelihood of residing in relatively old housing than whites elsewhere.  The same is true in DD
comparisons among blacks only – there are no statistically significant differences across the state-
groups.
The most statistically durable, and somewhat puzzling, results appear in the columns for the
number of rooms.  Of course, the number of rooms is a crude measure of housing unit size, and so its18 The coefficient is -0.27 (t-stat = 7.23) when using non-experimental group A and all
households.  The coefficient is -0.18 (t-stat = 3.47) when using non-experimental group B and all
households.  See table A2.
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interpretation is not without ambiguity.  But by this standard, relative to whites, blacks in fair housing
states appear to have lost ground over the decade compared to blacks in the non-experimental states. 
Although not always strongly significant, the negative coefficients persist for both renters and owners,
for group A and group B of non-experimental states, for each population subsample, for specifications
including the black proportion of each state’s population (and its interaction with the race dummy
variable) and for specification including state and state-year dummies.  The coefficients are non-trivial in
magnitude, but they are far from large: 0.2 rooms is about 4 percent of the mean endowment of rooms.
The proximate causes of this result are straightforward.  For example, among owners, blacks
and whites in the non-experimental states (groups A and B) and whites in the experimental states all
increased their average number of rooms during the 1960s, but blacks in the experimental state-group
did not.  The underlying economic explanation remains unclear, though four plausible hypotheses
suggest themselves.  
The first hypothesis is directly related to the selection issues discussed above.  Perhaps the fair-
housing laws facilitated movement of relatively wealthy black renters into the owner-occupied category,
and perhaps within the owner-occupied category, they were less affluent than others.  In other words,
the fair-housing laws might have driven selection into the ownership sample which simultaneously
tended to lower the average wealth and the number of rooms for both black renters and owners.  The
regressions control for income, education, and age, all of which should be strongly correlated with
wealth, but wealth itself remains unobserved.  Table 3, however, suggested that the laws were not
associated with significant differential selection into the ownership category.  Furthermore, when renters
and owners are pooled into one sample so that selection into the owner category cannot lead to a
change in sample composition, the negative b8 coefficient for the number of rooms is not undermined
(appendix table A1).18 
A second hypothesis is that fair housing laws alleviated supply constraints faced by black
families, allowing the formation of smaller households that happened to inhabit fewer rooms on average. 20
Again, there is very little support for this conjecture.  The regressions of table 4 already control for
household size directly; and in table 3, where household size is treated as a dependent variable, there is
no evidence that the fair-housing laws were associated with significant relative changes.  
A third hypothesis is that whites in fair-housing states responded to the laws by moving to
relatively large suburban homes.  In this case, blacks in fair-housing states might appear to have fared
poorly relative to whites in the DDD framework, even as they benefitted from the laws by gaining
access to better housing than before.  In fact, a DD estimate using a white-only sample suggests that
white households in the experimental states did increase their number of rooms relative to whites
elsewhere, but only by about 0.05 rooms (t-stat = 4.57), and white renters did not.  In a similar black-
only DD framework, there is no support for the notion for that blacks in fair-housing states increased
their number of rooms relative to other blacks: black owners and renters both lost ground in the fair-
housing states relative to blacks in other states. 
A fourth hypothesis, more difficult to assess directly than the previous three, is that other
policies and programs, such as urban renewal and public housing, were undertaken with differing
degrees of intensity across the state-groups and that they had differential racial impacts that confound
the DDD estimates.  According to Weicher (1972) urban renewal programs, particularly their slum
clearance aspect, tended to reduce the stock of low-cost housing and make relatively poor residents,
particularly black poor residents, worse off (also see Staples 1970 and White 1980).  The 1970 HUD
Statistical Yearbook reports cumulative funding (1950-1970) for urban renewal projects in each state. 
Per capita disbursements for “urban renewal projects” suggest that the experimental states ($29.7 per
1970 capita) and non-experimental group A ($28.5 per 1970 capita) were similar, but that non-
experimental group B received considerably less funding ($19.5 per 1970 capita).  The funding
disparity gap narrows, though not by much, if calculated relative to each state’s urban population: $37.3
in the experimental states, $37.8 in non-experimental group A, and $29.0 in non-experimental group B. 
Of course, the urban renewal funding figures are not precise indicators of the extent of slum clearance,
or more to the point, of the extent to which the projects reduced the overall supply of housing for
blacks relative to whites.  But on the basis of the funding figures, it would be difficult to argue that the19 Public housing and urban renewal efforts often went hand-in-hand.  The HUD Yearbook
reports the number of low-rent public housing units in 1970 by state (but unfortunately, not for earlier
years).  The experimental states and non-experimental group A are nearly identical in terms of units per
capita (0.00388 and 0.00387), whereas group B has fewer units (0.00252).  In terms of public housing
units inhabited by blacks per black capita, a more substantial difference emerges between the
experimental states and group A.  The experimental states had 0.0177 black-inhabited units per black
capita, whereas group A had 0.0234, and group B had 0.0158.  It is possible, therefore, that public housing
alleviated more housing market pressure for blacks in non-experimental group A than in the experimental
states (or in group B), but even among urban blacks, public housing was a relatively small portion of the
housing market, and the difference between state-groups was smaller yet.
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experimental states were substantially more aggressive in their renewal efforts than non-experimental
group A.  Morever, if significantly more of the older housing stock in predominantly black
neighborhoods had been demolished in the experimental states than in the non-experimental states, then
one would expect a DD estimate (among blacks) of the relative change in the likelihood of residing in
older housing to be negative.  But it is not.  More systematic investigation of urban renewal’s impact on
racial disparities in housing markets is certainly warranted, but a comprehensive assessment, state by
state, extends far beyond the bounds of this paper.19  
The negative result on the number of rooms is interesting, but its economic significance should
not be overstated.  First, the coefficient represents an economically small difference.  Second, as noted
below, the “rooms” component’s influence on the overall hedonic housing values is offset by other
factors. 
Hedonic Index
The hedonic index is a composite estimate of housing consumption in 1960 and 1970, formed
using race-specific valuations of various property characteristics in 1960 as weights (thereby avoiding
the issue of endogenous price changes during the decade).  Table 5 reports DDD estimates of the effect
of fair-housing laws on the hedonic index.  Among owners, there is no evidence that the fair-housing
laws facilitated improvements in blacks’ housing; the coefficients are consistently negative and
insignificantly different from zero.  Among renters, the results suggest a more positive influence.  In
comparison with both non-experimental groups, the racial gap among renters in fair-housing states
appears to have improved slightly relative to the racial gap among renters in non-fair-housing states (by22
about 2 to 4 percent).  When the hedonic results for renters are decomposed, it appears that the age-
of-building, bathrooms, and attachment variables all contribute to the result.  
This finding may seem somewhat puzzling given the results in table 4 which suggested that there
were no significant positive effects on the quantities of various housing components, and in fact, that
there was a slight relative decline in the number of rooms per household in fair-housing states.  In this
regard, it is important to note that the hedonic indices weight housing characteristics differently by race,
and so changes in the hedonic indices reflect a combination of changes in quantities and racial
differences in the weights assigned to those quantities.  Of all the results presented in this paper, this
finding is most suggestive of a positive fair-housing effect on blacks’ housing quality during the 1960s. 
However, it is economically small, found only among renters, and certainly falls far short of the hopes
and expectations of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing and the groups that it
represented.  
6.  Suburbanization, Segregation, and Neighborhood Racial Composition 
The effect of fair-housing laws on the racial composition of neighborhoods deserves special
attention for at least three reasons.  First, one could argue that facilitating residential integration per se
was a central goal of the fair-housing legislation, distinct from the goal of improving the physical quality
of blacks’ housing.  Second, one could argue that white neighborhoods, on average, had relatively high
levels of unobserved quality (better public services, better schools, higher-human capital neighbors,
etc.), and therefore, the racial integration of previously white neighborhoods could signal improved
access to high-quality neighborhoods.  Third, while the model outlined in section 3 suggests that the
effect of the legislation on the value of black-owned housing is difficult to interpret, the effect on the
value of housing in predominantly black neighborhoods is more clear: ceteris paribus, demand for
housing in predominantly black neighborhoods should have fallen if fair-housing legislation effectively
lowered the cost of housing elsewhere.  
The IPUMS data are not particularly well-suited for analyzing changes in the degree or nature
of residential segregation.  The 1960 IPUMS data do not reveal city codes, and even the suburban20 In 1960 and 1970, many households have their metro status variable classified as either “not
available” or “in metro area, central-city status unknown”.  In both cases, suburban residence is
undetectable.  See Ruggles and Sobek (1997) for details regarding the coverage and classification of the
IPUMS “metro” variable.
21 Due to the metro variable’s coverage, Colorado is completely dropped from the sample in 1960,
but in the sample in 1970.  Omitting Colorado in 1970 has a slight impact on the estimates.
22 For owners, using group A, b = 0.006 (s.e. = 0.018); using group B, b = -0.048 (s.e.=0.03).  For
renters, using group A, b = 0.004 (s.e. = 0.009); using group B, b = 0.001 (s.e. = 0.015).
23 Data are from ICPSR Studies 7552 (census tract data for 1960), 8126 (fourth count housing
summary tape for 1970), and 9014 (fourth count population summary tape for 1970).  The 1960 population
count and housing characteristics were compiled and reported for the full population, whereas the 1970
data are based on a 20 percent sample.  Education data in 1960 are based on a 25 percent sample. 
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location variable is compromised by confidentiality restrictions in both 1960 and 1970.20  In table 6, the
IPUMS data are taken at face value, households with indeterminate suburban status are omitted, and
DDD coefficients for suburban residence (conditional on residing in a metropolitan area) are estimated
with the reduced samples.21  The results are sensitive to the sample restrictions that are used.  With
group A, the results are generally statistically weak, suggesting little or no effect of fair-housing laws on
the likelihood of suburban residence, but among high school graduates who owned their homes, blacks
seem to have become even less likely than whites to reside in the suburbs.  Black renters in strong fair-
housing states, on the other hand, seem to have slightly increased their relative likelihood of residing in
the suburbs.  With group B, again the results are usually statistically weak, particularly among owners,
with a notable exception for the sample of recent movers in which the DDD coefficient is significant and
negative.  Among renters, however, the results are more consistently positive and large.  When a black-
only sample is used to estimate DD coefficients, it is evident that blacks in the experimental states did
not increase their likelihood of living in the suburbs relative to blacks living elsewhere, rather differences
in white suburbanization across the state groups appears to drive the positive coefficients.22
Census tract-level data for metropolitan areas are especially useful for their insight into issues
related to residential segregation.23  In general, census tracts are bounded by highways, rivers, railways,
major streets, or other “natural” divisions, though they are subject to change as new tracts are added,
old tracts are subdivided, and boundaries shift.  In 1960 and 1970 in the states included in the
comparison groups discussed above, approximately 4,300 people resided in the average census tract. 24 For some cities, after one re-aggregates tracts that have been split between 1960 and 1970, the
loss of coverage from boundary changes is less significant than for others.  However, after having tried to
make the links within several cities, it is clear that this approach is best suited for case studies as it
requires tremendous attention to detail in analyzing the maps. 
25  The dissimilarity index is based on the distribution of people across census tracts within a
metropolitan area.  The measure lies between zero and one, and higher values correspond to higher levels
of segregation.  More precisely, dissimilarity = ½ × 3|(nonwhitei/nonwhitet) - (whitei/whitet)|, where
nonwhitei is the number of nonwhites in a particular census tracts, nonwhitet is the number of nonwhites
in the metro area, and the summation is taken over all tracts in the area.
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Essentially, a census tract is the closest census analogue to a neighborhood. 
Unlike the IPUMS household data, the tract data identify metropolitan areas in both 1960 and
1970, and so in principle, comparisons over time within cities are possible.  In practice, however,
combining the census tract information for 1960 and 1970 is difficult for three reasons.  First, the
underlying 1970 dataset includes more suburban tracts than the 1960 dataset.  By using maps and
consistency tables that are included in the published census volumes for each metropolitan area in each
year, one can (usually) identify the “new” areas added in 1970 and therefore make more consistent
comparisons over time.  With approximately 90 metropolitan areas and more than 15,000 tracts in the
three sets of comparison states, this undertaking is non-trivial but feasible, and the samples used here
reflect those adjustments.  Second, the tract numbering scheme changed between 1960 and 1970.  This
makes matching the same tract over time more difficult than it need be, but not an impossible task. 
Third, and less remediable, there are many tract boundary changes, and this does make it impossible to
fully link tracts over time.24
Here, I use a sample of census tracts from 1960 and 1970 drawn from a fixed set of
metropolitan areas with adjustments made to the 1970 collection of tracts to maintain roughly the same
geographic coverage within metro areas.  I then calculated dissimilarity indices for each metropolitan
area in each year.25  The indices are similar to those reported by Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999),
with a few differences: first, I exclude tracts covering “new” space in 1970; second, I calculate the
dissimilarity index on a white vs. nonwhite basis whereas Cutler et al. work with black vs. nonblack
figures (some tract-level variables used below are available only on the white vs. nonwhite basis even
though basic population counts of blacks are provided); third, if a metropolitan area sits in more than26 St. Louis (MO and IL) and Weirton-Steubenville (WV and OH) are treated as single units in
the dissimilarity indices, and in table 7, they are included in both non-experimental groups.  The
fundamental results do not depend on their inclusion or exclusion.
27 In these figures, metro area segregation levels are weighted by population.
28 Counts of the black population in 1970 are suppressed if there were under 25 in a particular
tract, but the nonwhite counts can be calculated as the difference between the total population and white
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one state, Cutler et al. treat it as a single unit, which is appropriate for their analysis.  Given this paper’s
focus on state laws, if part of the metropolitan area is in a state that is not included in the study, then
those tracts are omitted.26  
A simple comparison of the change in the level of segregation across experimental and non-
experimental state-groups during the 1960s suggests that segregation did fall by slightly more in the
experimental states than in the non-experimental states, though the differences are small.  In metro areas
with at least 1,000 nonwhites in 1960, the experimental state metro area segregation level fell by 0.019,
non-experimental group A fell by 0.008, and non-experimental group B fell by 0.012.27  Looking over
longer periods, Cutler et al. (1999) suggest that changes in metro area segregation levels were
influenced by differences in nonwhite and white population growth rates.  With that in mind, table 7
regresses the change in the segregation level between 1960 and 1970 on log nonwhite population
growth, log white population growth, and the fair housing dummy variable for a sample including metro
areas with at least 1,000 nonwhite residents in 1960.  Observations are weighted by 1960 total
population.  Again, the fair-housing coefficients are economically small and statistically insignificant.  
Cutler et al. (1999, table 4) show that between 1940 and 1960 there was a slight decline in the
proportion of census tracts that were nearly exclusively white (at least 99 percent white), but that after
1960, there was a large decline.  To the extent that residential integration was improving after 1960, it
appears to have been driven largely by this decline in exclusively white neighborhoods.  The “very
white” row of panel A of table 8 examines census tract data from 1960 and 1970 to see whether state-
level anti-discrimination laws facilitated such integration, even if the laws made no discernable impact on
the overall metro area segregation indices.  The “mostly nonwhite” row focuses on the other end of the
racial composition distribution, examining changes in the proportion of tracts that were mostly nonwhite
(more than 50 percent).28  Appendix table A3 reports summary statistics for the census tract data.population counts (which are rarely missing values).
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Specifically, panel A reports results from OLS difference-in-difference regressions that include
metropolitan-area fixed effects and control for the proportion of the area’s population that is nonwhite
in each year.  The basic regression specification is: 
(2)  Yijt = a + gj + b1 (Nonwhite/Pop) jt +  b2  Yeart + b3 (FHj × Yeart),
where Y equals 1 if the census tract is “very white” and zero otherwise (in column 1), or Y equals 1 if
“mostly nonwhite” and zero otherwise (in column 2); gj is a set of metropolitan area fixed effects;
Nonwhitejt is the proportion of the metro area’s population that is nonwhite in year t; Year equals 1 in
1970 and zero in 1960; and FHj × Yeart interacts fair-housing status and the year dummy.  The fair-
housing dummy is not entered separately because it is not identified when there are city-specific fixed
effects.  The coefficient on the interaction term is of particular interest because it measures the
difference in the change in the probability of a census tract being “very white” (or “mostly nonwhite”)
between fair-housing states and non-fair-housing states, after controlling for the size of each city’s
nonwhite population, for a baseline trend from 1960 to 1970, and for time-invariant city-specific
factors.
Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of “very white” tracts fell from about 59 to 45 percent
of the tracts in the sample.  Controlling for the nonwhite proportion of each metro area’s population (as
described in equation 2), the decline was slightly larger in the experimental states than in non-
experimental group A, though the difference is not strongly significant; the estimate using non-
experimental group B is indistinguishable from zero.  The overall proportion of “mostly nonwhite” tracts
increased slightly during the 1960s, from 8 to 12 percent of total tracts.  Again, there is weakly
significant evidence that this increase was smaller in the experimental states than in non-experimental
group A, but there is no evidence that the change in the experimental states was different from that in
non-experimental state group B. 
For another perspective on neighborhood change in light of the fair-housing laws, I have
designated census tracts as “high human capital tracts” if their proportion of adults (over age 24) with at
least twelve years of education was above the sample median in the appropriate year (0.39 in 1960 and27
0.51 in 1970).  Then, using a sample of those high human capital tracts in panel B of table 8, I regress
the proportion of each tract’s population that was nonwhite on metropolitan-area fixed effects, the
proportion of the metro area’s population that was nonwhite, the proportion of the metropolitan area’s
stock of high school graduates that was nonwhite, a dummy variable for 1970, and the interaction of the
1970 dummy and the state fair-housing status variable.  The basic idea is to see whether high human
capital tracts in fair-housing states increased their proportion of nonwhite residents relative to those in
non-fair housing states, ceteris paribus.  While the proportion of nonwhite residents in relatively high
human capital tracts increased between 1960 and 1970 (from 3.0 to about 4.6 percent), it did not
increase by any more in the strong fair-housing states than in the comparison groups of states. 
Finally, in panels C and D, I examine changes in the price of homes or level of rent in “mostly
nonwhite” neighborhoods compared to others in a DDD framework.  The regression is a slightly
modified version of the earlier DDD equation, including metro area fixed effects (gj) rather a fair-
housing state dummy variable (FH) in the first level of controls:
(3)  lnValueijt = a + gj + b1 lnPopjt + b2 MostNWijt + b3 Yeart  + 
b4 (MostNWijt × FHj) + b5 (MostNWijt × Yeart) + b6 (FHj × Yeart) + b7 (MostNWijt × FHj × Yeart), 
where i indexes tracts, j indexes metropolitan areas, and t indexes census years.  MostNW equals 1 if
more than half the tract’s residents are nonwhite.  To capture city-specific housing demand shocks
during the 1960s, I include the natural log of metro area population in the regressions, though the basic
results are not sensitive to its inclusion.  b7 estimates the change in housing values in mostly nonwhite
tracts relative to mostly white tracts in strong fair-housing states relative to weak fair-housing states. 
The model of section 3 suggested that the demand for and price of housing in predominantly nonwhite
neighborhoods should have fallen if the conventional description of high demand and prices for housing
in nonwhite neighborhoods is accurate and if the fair-housing laws worked as intended.  Again, there is
no evidence for a significant fair-housing impact in panels C and D.  
If the tracts that became mostly nonwhite between 1960 and 1970 had higher than average
housing quality than those originally counted as mostly nonwhite, then the comparisons over time of29  In the 1970 data, it does appear that the “new” mostly nonwhite areas had higher property
values and rents than the original mostly nonwhite areas.
30 Because exactly matching the tracts is impossible due to boundary changes, this exercise is
quite imperfect, but it goes a considerable distance to improving the comparisons over time. 
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property values in “nonwhite neighborhoods” could be biased upward.29  The extent of this bias would
have to differ across the state groups to influence the DDD estimates in panels C and D.  But to make
sure that “new” mostly nonwhite tracts are not confounding the results in panels C and D, it helps to
compare the geographic coverage of the 1960 and 1970 mostly nonwhite tracts using the maps in each
metropolitan area’s census volume, and then to identify tracts that were mostly nonwhite in both census
years.30  After doing so, I re-ran the regressions, assigning tracts “mostly nonwhite” status only if they
were clearly mostly nonwhite in both 1960 and 1970 – the idea is to compare (roughly) constant areas
of coverage for nonwhite and white tracts over time.  The results are substantively unchanged: there is
no evidence of a relative decline in housing prices in nonwhite neighborhoods due to the fair-housing
laws.
7. Conclusions
In examining both federal and state-level laws, the economics literature on the labor market
impact of anti-discrimination policies is much deeper than the literature on the housing market impact of
anti-discrimination policies.  While audit studies suggest that housing market discrimination is still
common and costly (Yinger 1998), much less is known about the extent to which legislation has
reduced discrimination’s effect on housing market outcomes over time.  This is somewhat surprising
given fair-housing’s prominent place among the Civil Rights Movement’s legislative accomplishments
and given the central role that housing discrimination has played in the evolution of urban economies and
the development of urban policy.  
States passed fair housing laws at different times, providing useful variation for the measurement
of the policy’s impact on housing market outcomes of blacks relative to whites.  This paper’s analysis
of home ownership rates, housing values, residential segregation, and housing characteristics indicates
that the state-level fair-housing laws did not have a strong positive influence on the housing market29
outcomes of African Americans.  Even among relatively young household heads, relatively well-
educated household heads, and household heads who had recently moved, the overriding message
from the data is that the state-laws did not have an economically significant positive effect during the
1960s.  There is some evidence, from the hedonic indices, that renters in strong fair-housing states
slightly improved their housing quality relative to those elsewhere, but the estimates are economically
small (2 to 4 percent).  There is also some evidence from the IPUMS data in table 6 that the racial gap
in suburban residence rates declined more in fair housing states than elsewhere, but this did not lead to
larger declines in metro area residential segregation (table 7) or to larger increases in blacks’ residence
in high human capital neighborhoods (table 8). 
Importantly, African Americans’ average housing market outcomes did improve relative to
those of whites during the 1960s, even after controlling for income and educational gains.  Moreover, in
the sample of northeastern and midwestern states analyzed here, the proportion of exclusively white
neighborhoods declined markedly, and African-American households increased their representation in
neighborhoods with relatively high levels of human capital.  It appears, however, that state fair-housing
laws did not make a large contribution to that progress. 
The usual concerns about the endogeneity of laws and about unobserved events that
differentially affected blacks relative to whites in strong fair-housing states relative to non-experimental
states arise here as well.  Although policymakers and fair-housing advocates were obviously concerned
with blacks’ housing market outcomes, studies of the political history of state fair-housing legislation do
not suggest that differences in the timing of adoption across states were driven by differential changes in
blacks’ relative housing market outcomes.  The changing size of the black population would be a prime
candidate for linking policy changes and changes in average black housing market outcomes, but the
results are generally insensitive to adding controls for the black proportion of each state’s population. 
Dealing with potentially confounding unobserved phenomena is inherently difficult, though the DDD
strategy, in combination with the long list of independent variables (income, education, etc.), is designed
to control for housing market influences other than those coming from the fair-housing laws. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that changes in discriminatory sentiment or the twin policies of urban renewal30
and public housing had an independent influence on blacks’ relative housing market outcomes.  On the
basis of the existing evidence, it is difficult to argue that their influence was significantly uneven across all
the state groups compared here. 
Could the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 have made a more substantial contribution to
African-Americans’ economic progress than the non-southern state laws did?  A more direct
examination of the federal impact would certainly be worth undertaking, but on the basis of the
evidence presented in this paper, a significant federal effect seems unlikely.  First, the state laws, though
weak, were generally stronger than the 1968 federal law, and they appear to have had little impact. 
Second, if housing market discrimination became less overt over time, then the early state laws may
have had more easily identifiable targets than the later federal law.  From a broader perspective,
however, it has been argued that an array of federal anti-discrimination efforts made their largest labor
market impact in the South (Donohue and Heckman 1991), and it is possible, though far from certain,
that the federal efforts also had a concentrated regional impact on housing markets.  It is also possible
that the federal fair-housing legislation, passed almost immediately after the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Jr. and the ensuing riots, somehow influenced public opinion in a way that diminished
discriminatory norms.  But again, the existence of such an effect is by no means certain, and the
hypothesis awaits direct, econometric examination.31
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Maine 1965 (rental only)




New Hampshire 1961 (rental only) 1965
New Jersey 1961 1966









Note: California’s law was suspended in 1964 by a constitutional amendment; it was reinstated in 1966
when the state supreme court ruled that the amendment was unconstitutional (Casstevens 1968).
Sources: The table draws heavily on Trends in Housing (a bi-monthly publication of the National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) and on Fair Housing Laws: Summaries and Text of State
and Municipal Laws (published by  the Housing and Home Finance Agency in 1964).  Case studies in
Eley and Casstevens (1968) have also been helpful.36












   Nonwhite proportion of population 0.07 0.08 0.10
   Ownership rate 0.58 0.63 0.63
   Ownership rate (B-W) -0.34 -0.34 -0.27
   Persons per room (all) 0.75 0.74 0.78
   Persons per room (B-W) 0.17 0.18 0.20
   Proportion of households in old stock 0.49 0.52 0.41
   Proportion of households in old stock (B-W) 0.23 0.27 0.29
   Proportion of households w/ two baths 0.08 0.07 0.09
   Proportion of households w/ two baths (B-W) -0.05 -0.04 -0.06
   Average log family income (all) 8.69 8.65 8.54
   Average log family income (B-W) -0.54 -0.53 -0.59
   Votes for George Wallace (1968) 0.07 0.09 0.12
1950-1960 trends 
   Change in nonwhite proportion of population 0.019 0.019 0.011
   Change in prop. of owner-occ. units (all) 0.072 0.076 0.067
   Change in prop. of owner-occ. units (NW-W) -0.037 -0.038 -0.021
   Prop. of 1960 housing units built since 1950 0.23 0.22 0.25
   Change in log family income (all) 0.59 0.59 0.63
   Change in log family income (B-W) -0.12 -0.0043 -0.096
Notes: Nonwhite proportion of the population, change in proportion of owner-occupied units, and
proportion of units built during the 1950s are calculated using the published population and housing
census volumes.  Other variables are calculated using the IPUMS samples in 1960 and 1950.  The
samples drawn from the IPUMS include black and white native-born household heads, age 20 to 59,
who were not in school nor in the armed services, who had positive income, and who were not missing
information regarding migrant status.  Non-experimental group A includes: Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin.  Non-experimental group B includes: Delaware, Maryland, Kansas, Missouri, and
West Virginia.  The experimental states include: Connecticut, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York, and Rhode Island.  
Sources: Household-level data were taken from the IPUMS (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).  As noted,
state-level data were taken from various volumes of the published population and housing censuses in
1950 and 1960.  Votes for George Wallace are from http://www.uselectionatlas.org/. 37
Table 3: Home Ownership, Household Size, and Fair Housing Laws, DDD Estimates, 1960-1970



































































Notes: The dependent variable for the ownership regressions equals 1 if unit is owner-occupied and 0
otherwise.  The dependent variable for the household size regressions is the number of “person
records” in the sampled household.  t-stats (OLS) or z-stats (probit) based on robust standard errors
are in parentheses.  Each reported coefficient is from a separate regression and relates to the interaction
of the fair housing, black, and 1970 indicator variables.  The ownership probit regressions control for38
the household head’s age (quartic), years of education (quadratic), marital status, sex, veteran status,
and migrant status (whether changed states in last five years), as well as the household’s number of
members (quadratic), number of children (series of indicators), and log family income (adjusted to 1969
dollars; plus a dummy for top-coded income).  The coefficient is expressed in dF/dX form.  The
household size regressions do not include household characteristics.  Ownership regression samples
include native-born household heads from age 20 to 59, with positive income, who did not live on a
farm, who were not in the military, and who were not missing information on the control variables. 
Household size regressions include all native-born non-farm household heads from age 20 to 59. 
“Movers” are household heads living in a residence that is different from the one they lived in five years
earlier.  Non-experimental group A includes: Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.  Non-
experimental group B includes: Delaware, Maryland, Kansas, Missouri, and West Virginia.  The
experimental states include: Connecticut, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and
Rhode Island.  
Sources: Micro-level census data are from the IPUMS for 1960 and 1970 (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).39
Table 4: Housing Characteristics and Fair Housing Laws, DDD Estimates, 1960-1970
Variable Two Baths (Probit) Old Building (Probit) Rooms (OLS)


























All, w/ state and 













All, w/ prop. blk and 




























































































All, w/ state and 













All, w/ prop. blk and 



































































Notes: t-stats (OLS) or z-stats (probit) based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The
number of observations are in square brackets.  Mean values dependent variables values are in curved40
brackets.  Sample sizes change when particular housing characteristics are unreported.  See notes to
table 3 for descriptions of state-groups.  The “old building” variable equals one for buildings over 30
years old (the topcode in 1960 and 1970).  Each reported coefficient is from a separate regression and
relates to the interaction of the fair housing, black, and 1970 indicator variables.  The regressions
control for the household head’s age (quartic), years of education (quadratic), marital status, sex,
veteran status, and migrant status (whether changed states in last five years), as well as the household’s
number of members (quadratic), number of children (series of indicators), and log family income
(adjusted to 1969 dollars; plus a dummy for top-coded income).  The coefficients for “two baths” and
“old building”  are from probits and expressed in dF/dX form evaluated at sample means.  “Movers”
are household heads living in a residence that is different from the one they lived in five years earlier. 
Sources: Micro-level census data are from the IPUMS for 1960 and 1970 (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).41
Table 5: Hedonic Valuation of Housing and Fair Housing Laws, DDD Estimates, 1960-1970







































































Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses.  The number of observations is in square brackets.  The mean
value of the dependent variable is in curved brackets.  See notes to table 3 for descriptions of state-
groups.  The text describes the construction of the hedonic indices; note that for owners, the figures42
relate to property values; for renters, the figures relate to monthly rent.  The regressions control for the
household head’s age (quartic), years of education (quadratic), marital status, sex, veteran status, and
migrant status (whether changed states in last five years), as well as the household’s number of
members (quadratic), number of children (series of indicators), and log family income (adjusted to 1969
dollars; plus a dummy for top-coded income).  “Movers” are household heads living in a residence that
is different from the one they lived in five years earlier. 
Sources: Micro-level census data are from the IPUMS for 1960 and 1970 (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).43
Table 6: Suburban Residence and Fair Housing Laws, DDD Estimates, 1960-1970







































































Notes: z-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The number of observations is in
square brackets.  The mean value of the dependent variable is in curved brackets.  See notes to table 3
for descriptions of state-groups.  The regressions control for the household head’s age (quartic), years44
of education (quadratic), marital status, sex, veteran status, and migrant status (whether changed states
in last five years), as well as the household’s number of members (quadratic), number of children (series
of indicators), and log family income (adjusted to 1969 dollars; plus a dummy for top-coded income). 
As discussed in the text, the availability of the suburban/central city distinction is compromised in some
places for reasons of confidentiality.  See Ruggles and Sobek (1997) for a detailed description of this
issue.  “Movers” are household heads living in a residence that is different from the one they lived in five
years earlier. 
Sources: Micro-level census data are from the IPUMS for 1960 and 1970 (Ruggles and Sobek 1997).45
Table 7: Metropolitan Area Segregation and Fair Housing Laws, 1960-1970
Non-Experimental Group With Group A With Group B





















Metro Areas 70 49
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in a dissimilarity index calculated on a white/nonwhite
basis (1970 value - 1960 value).  The samples include metropolitan areas available in both the 1960
and 1970 census tract data with tracts excluded if they were added to the metro area in 1970 (usually,
additional suburban tracts).  Also, only tracts falling within the set of states used throughout the paper
are included.   Metro areas with fewer than 1,000 nonwhite residents in 1960 are not included. 
Observations are weighted by 1960 total population.  The fair housing coefficients change somewhat if
the cities are unweighted, but they remain far from statistical and economic significance.  t-statistics are
in parentheses.  
Sources: Census tract data were extracted from ICPSR studies 7552 (1960 census), 9014 (1970
fourth count population summary tape), and 8126 (1970 fourth count housing summary tape).46
Table 8: Census Tract Racial Composition, Property Values, and Fair Housing Laws, 1960-1970
Non-Experimental Group With Group A With Group B
Panel A: All Tracts, Racial Composition 




     Mean Dependent Variable 0.521 0.489
     Number of Tracts 25451 17430
     Number of Metro Areas 77 52




     Mean Dependent Variable 0.0979 0.0947
     Number of Tracts 25451 17430
     Number of Metro Areas 77 52
Panel B: High Human Capital Tracts, Proportion Nonwhite
     Nonwhite Proportion of            





     Mean Dependent Variable 0.0364 0.0387
     Number of Tracts 12637 9071
     Number of Metro Areas 77 52
Panel C: All Tracts, Property Value




     Number of Tracts 23649 16007
     Number of Metro Areas 77 52
Panel D: All Tracts, Rent




     Number of Tracts 24778 16910
     Number of Metro Areas 77 5247
Notes: In Panel A: the “very white” row reports results from an OLS regression in which the dependent
variable equals one if the white proportion of the tract’s population is over 0.99; the “mostly nonwhite”
row reports results from an OLS regression in which the dependent variable equals one if the nonwhite
proportion of the tract’s population is over 0.50.  The regressions include metro-area fixed effects, the
proportion of the area’s population that was nonwhite in each year, a 1970 dummy variable, and the
interaction of the 1970 dummy and a dummy for fair-housing states.  The table reports the coefficient
on the interaction of fair-housing status and the 1970 dummy variable.  In Panel B: the dependent
variable is the nonwhite proportion of each tract’s population; in this case, the sample consists only of
census tracts in which the proportion of adults (over 24 years old) with at least twelve years of
education was above the median for tracts in that year (based on tracts from the experimental states
and both non-experimental groups); in 1960, the median tract’s proportion of adults with twelve years
of education was 0.391; in 1970, the median proportion was 0.511.  The regressions include
metropolitan area-specific fixed effects, the nonwhite proportion of the metro area’s adult population
with at least twelve years of schooling, the nonwhite proportion of the metro area’s population, a 1970
dummy variable, and the interaction of the 1970 dummy and a dummy for fair-housing states.  The table
reports the coefficient on the interaction of fair-housing status and the 1970 dummy variable.  In Panel
C: the log of average property value or monthly gross rent is regressed on metro area fixed effects, log
of metro area population, a dummy variable for mostly nonwhite tracts, a 1970 dummy variable, an
interaction of the mostly nonwhite and 1970 variables, an interaction of the mostly nonwhite variable
and a dummy for experimental states, an interaction of the experimental and 1970 dummies, and
(reported in table) an interaction of the 1970 dummy, the dummy for experimental states, and the
dummy for mostly nonwhite tracts.  Throughout table 8, the 1970 census tract data are reported only
for those with at least 25 residents, and so the 1960 sample is conditioned accordingly.  Observations
in Panel A are unweighted.  Observations in Panel B, C, and D are weighted by tract population.  t-
statistics are in parentheses.  
Sources: Census tract data were extracted from ICPSR studies 7552 (1960 census), 9014 (1970
fourth count population summary tape), and 8126 (1970 fourth count housing summary tape).48
Appendix Table A1: Fair Housing Laws and Housing Outcomes, Renters and Owners in Same Sample, 1960-1970
Rooms (OLS) Two Baths (Probit) Old Building (Probit) Suburb (Probit)




































All households, w/ prop. blk

































































Notes: t-statistics (OLS) or z-statistics (probit) are in parentheses.  See the notes to tables 4 and 6 for full descriptions of the variables and
regression specifications.
Sources: Household data are from the IPUMS (Ruggles and Sobek, 1997).49
Appendix Table A2: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables for Household Data
---------------------White Households---------------------- ------------------------Black Households---------------------
















Year 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970
All Households, Owners and Renters
   Ownership 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.39 0.40



























   Two Baths 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.086 0.14 0.068 0.13 0.060 0.15
   Old Building 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.59 0.51 0.74 0.62 0.59 0.48
















































   Suburban 0.65 0.71 0.65 0.72 0.59 0.70 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.32
Renters
   Two Baths 0.023 0.044 0.022 0.042 0.026 0.064 0.010 0.021 0.014 0.027 0.017 0.039
   Old Building 0.68 0.58 0.70 0.58 0.54 0.44 0.75 0.64 0.79 0.65 0.73 0.59
















































   Suburban 0.27 0.35 0.38 0.50 0.29 0.51 0.066 0.079 0.090 0.101 0.12 0.14
Notes: Mean values from “All Households” samples are reported, with standard deviations for non-binary variables in brackets.  For the
experimental states, two figures for the hedonic indices are reported because the hedonic index is formed first using the experimental
states and non-experimental group A, and then using the experimental states and non-experimental group B.  The changes over time are
very similar with the different sets of hedonic weights.  See the notes to tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 for more details regarding the variables and50
samples.
Source: Household level data from the IPUMS (Ruggles and Sobek, 1997).51
Appendix Table A3: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables for Census Tract Data
State Group Experimental Experimental Non-Exp. A Non-Exp. A  Non-Exp. B Non-Exp. B
Year 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970
Very White Tracts 0.58 0.43 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.35
Mostly Nonwhite Tracts 0.069 0.11 0.091 0.13 0.11 0.13
































































Notes: Mean values are reported for the “all household” samples.  The proportion of “very white” and “mostly nonwhite” tracts are not
weighted; the other variables are weighted by tract population.  Standard deviations for non-binary variables are in brackets.  See the
notes to table 8 for full descriptions of the variables and sample.
Sources: The census tract data were extracted from ICPSR studies 7552 (1960 census), 9014 (1970 fourth count population summary
tape), and 8126 (1970 fourth count housing summary tape).